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Incumbency Surge: Examining the 1996 Margin of Victory for U.S. House
Incumbents
Abstract
In 1996, the American public reelected 357 members to the United States House of Representatives; of
those running for reelection, 95% succeeded. Several congressmen received a large margin of victory over
their political opponents, similar to election results of the past. Trends in American politics have been the
overwhelming reelection rates of House incumbents as well as large margins of victory over challengers.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the factors influencing incumbents’ margin of victory in the 1996
Congressional elections.
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Amy Tenhouse
Incumbency Surge: Examining the 1996 Margin of
Victory for U.S. House Incumbents

In 1996, theAmerican public reelected 357 members to the United States
House of Representatives; of those running for reelection, 95% succeeded.
Several congressmen received a large margin of victory over their political
opponents, similar to election results of the past. Trends in American politics
have been the overwhelming reelection rates of House incumbents as well as
large margins of victory over challengers. The purpose of this paper is to
examine the factors influencing incumbents' margin of victory in the 1996
Congressional elections.

Literature Review
Most recent research concentrates on the increasing trend at all levels of
American government toward high reelection success. Paul Jacob explains
that today, challengers have an exceedingly difficult time trying to defeat an
incumbent. For example, incumbents who sought reelection in the 1988
general election had a 96% success rate and 98% in 1990. Though the
percentage decreased in 1992 because of House scandals, the general election
rate for incumbents still remained high at 93% (Jacob, 1994: 30). This is not
a new phenomenon as approximately 92% of all incumbent representatives
have been reelected sinceWorldWar II. Even in a year with a lower percentage
such as 1992, Davidson and Oleszek emphasize that "turnover [in the House]
resulted more from retirements (many involuntary) than from electoral
defeats" (Davidson, 1994: 63).
Drawing upon existing literature, Alford and Brady in Congress
Reconsidered have suggested four main reasons for this reelection
phenomenon. The reasons are as follows: (l) congressional district lines drawn
to favor incumbents; (2) increase resources of incumbent members; (3) weak
congressional challengers; and (4) weak party identification of voters (150
and 151).
The latter three explanations are supported by current research; however,
the frrst theory is not. By examining similar trends in the Senate, which does
not use district lines, researchers have concluded that congressional district
lines do not favor incumbents and are not an explanation for high incumbency
reelection rates (151). However, much research has demonstrated that
incumbents are usually rewarded on election days because of numerous
factors. These factors include congressional perquisites such as campaign
funding, franking privileges, and extensive media coverage. As a result, they
often face weaker challengers because of such effective use of these perquisites
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----------------------(Erikson andWright, 1993: 99, 101). Finally, American voters do not strongly
identify with one party as in the past. More people are declaring themselves
independent, and consequently, they are voting for the individual rather than
for the party with whom they identify. This practice often results in the
reelection of an incumbent (100). I wanted to continue researching
explanations for high incumbency reelection rates by examining the 1996
Congressional elections.The dependent variable will be the margin of victory.
The independent variables will be demographic and individual characteristics.
Variable Explanations
To examine the factors influencing incumbents' margin of victory, I will
look at six independent variables. Margin of victory is measured as the
percentage of votes an incumbent receives over his challenger. The
independent variables include: years of House service, ideology, political
party (individual characteristics), constituency education, average
constituency income, and presidential voting measure (demographic
characteristics). Mter using party as an additive variable in the fIrst regression
model, party identifIcation acts as an interactive variable in the second and
third regression models to better explain how the independent variables impact
margin of victory for each party.
Hypotheses
Based upon the previously mentioned independent variables and logical
reasoning, the following hypotheses are the expected results of the research.
All hypotheses are expected to be supported in the fIrst regression model
(party as an independent variable) as well as the second model and third
model which used party as an interactive variable.
For the fIrst model, I have hypothesized that Democrats will be more
likely than Republicans to receive a higher percentage of votes for two main
reasons. First, more American adults tend to affiliate with the Democratic
party than the Republican party (Davidson, 1994: 102). Though fewer
Democrats vote on average, more fringe voters (Le., Democrats) vote in a
presidential election year which results in more reelected Democrat
incumbents. Secondly, the coattail effect is still apparent today: "In
presidential years ... the party that wins more than its normal vote for president
wins more than its normal vote in the congressional contests" (Erikson and
Wright, 1993: 93). Therefore, since President Bill Clinton scored an easy
victory over challenger Bob Dole, the Democratic incumbent would receive
a greater amount of votes whereas Republicans would be more likely to be
rejected because of Dole's poor electoral showing.
Few Americans typically align themselves on one extreme side of the
ideological spectrum; few would consider themselves ultra-conservative or
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staunch liberal. Therefore, I predict that the candidates who tend to be the
most moderate will receive the largest margin of victory.
However, ideology may not be as strong an indicator of margin of victory
as other factors. Miller and Stokes, in their famous 1962 study of House
elections, concluded that "voters knew next to nothing about the performance
of either the parties or individual members of Congress" (Davidson, 1994:
110). Therefore, without knowledge of the congressperson's ideology, the
voter will not vote on the basis of conservatism or liberalism.
Next, I postulated that the more years a person serves in the House of
Representatives, the greater his margin of victory. Once in office for several
years, the incumbent becomes more familiar with the most beneficial
utilization of congressional perquisites; therefore, he may gain more name
recognition and media exposure, as well as a weaker challenger. Because of
these factors, the incumbent will receive more votes from his constituents
and consequently, a larger margin of victory.
The fourth hypothesis deals with two district characteristics, education
and income. The lower the constituents' level of education, usually, the lower
the constituent's income and therefore, the more likely he would be to support .
the incumbent Persons with a lower educational and financial standing are
usually less informed about government activities and politics, particularly
elections. They are less likely than persons with college degrees or those
who have more money to know about an opposing challenger because they
may not follow current events on or have access to television, radio, or
newspaper. Also, upper and middle class, well-educated individuals may
have more free time or find it necessary for their employment to stay updated
on elections and politics. Therefore, persons with less education and income
may be less aware of a challenger with little name recognition and would
vote for the incumbent, resulting in a larger margin of victory.
Finally, in the first regression model without separating margin of victory
by party, it is expected that presidential vote will have little to no effect on
margin of victory. However, it is expected to be a major indicator when party
acts as an interactive variable. I hypothesized that the greater a district's vote
for Republican George Bush in the 1988 election, the larger the margin of
victory for the Republican incumbent in 1996. Similarly, the opposite would
be true for Democrats; the more votes Bush received, the lower the margin
of victory for Democrats in 1996. Again, this hypothesis will be most relevant
for the second and third regression models which use political party as an
interactive variable rather than additive variable.

-=.:ln;;,:c~um=be.::.n::;c::..<y....:S::;ur=ge
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Research Design
Methodology

This study focuses on 351 incumbents in the U.S. House of
Representatives who ran for reelection and won. This is six less than the
total number of incumbents who retained their seats in Congress in the 1996
election. In order to provide the most representative data, I eliminated six
outliers from my research. Five cases from Louisiana were eliminated because
of the unusual runoff election process in which opponents may be of the
same party. Finally, I discarded the lone third party incumbent (Socialist) in
the House because I focused only on the two major political parties, Democrat
and Republican. All data for each case in this study are examined through
multiple regression.
I ran the multiple regression model in two ways using political party
affiliation. Because "[p]olitical analysts traditionally have found party
identification the single most powerful factor in determining voters' choices,"
I wanted to examine what influence party had on voters' decisions. Therefore,
I fmt used party as an independent variable, with Democrats coded as zero
and Republicans coded as one (Davidson, 1994: 102). Next, by running the
regression models separately for Democrats and Republicans, I examined
the independent variables to determine which had the biggest impact on
party's margin of victory.
Units of Measurement

In the first model, as noted above, party affiliation is coded with
Democrats as zero and Republicans as one. Ideology is the American
Conservative Union's (ACU) rating for U.S. House members, based upon
how often a representative supports the position held by the ACU. Income is
measured as the median family income within the district, and education is
the percent of persons age twenty-five and over who possess a college
bachelor's degree or higher. Finally, presidential voting measure is the
percentage of votes George Bush received in the 1988 presidential election.
Because of the unusual occurrence in the 1992 presidential election with a
major third party candidate, the 1988 election is a more representative example
of political culture and district ideology.
Table 1demonstrates the impact that the independent variables, including
political party identification, have on margin of victory. This multiple
regression model is significant at the .ססoo1 level according to the significant
F test, so these results are highly unlikely to occur by chance. By knowing
the independent variables, only 11 % of the variance in margin of victory can
be explained, meaning other factors not tested may have a great impact on
margin of victory.

55

Res Publica

Table 1
Education, Ideology, Income, 1988 Presidential Vote, Years of Service,
and Political Party
B

Education
Ideology
Income
'88 Pres Vote
Service
Party
(Constant)
R Square
Significant F

.355473
-.067068
-.438691
-.021131
.010910
1.71440
78.448458
.11066

Beta
.257514
-.245055
-.357934
-.055145
.082889
.075314

Significant T
.0032
.0450
.0001
.3195
.1069
.5329

.ססoo

When controlling for aU other independent variables, median family
income, a district characteristic, is the most significant value in determining
margin of victory. Income also proves to be the strongest determining factor
with an absolute beta weight of .357934. The B value of -.438691 indicates
that for every $1,000 increase in median family income, the margin of victory
decreases by .4 of a percentage point This marginal decrease supports
the original hypothesis that higher median income leads to less support for
the incumbent.
Another demographic trait, education, shows different results than
income. Statistically significant at the .01 level, education is the second
strongest indicator of margin of victory. With a B value of .355473, education
is shown to increase margin of victory by three tenths of a percentage point
for everyone percent of persons possessing a college bachelor's degree or
higher. These results contradict the expressed hypothesis because as education
increases, margin of victory increases as well. Though I assumed both income
and education would produce similar results, only the income value results
support the hypothesis.
In contrast to income and education, the last district characteristic,
presidential vote, is not significant at the 0.1 level, concurrent with the
proposed hypothesis. For each percentage point that George Bush earned in
the 1988 election, an incumbent's margin of victory decreases by only .02 of
a percentage point in 1996. The strength of this measure is very low as well
with a beta weight of .055145.
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The most significant individual characteristic variable is ideology,
statistically significant at .045. Ideology is a relatively strong indicator of
margin of victory (.245055), and the B value indicates that an increase in
ideology results in a small decrease in margin of victory. The more
conservative an incumbent, according to theAmerican Conservative Union's
ratings, the lower his margin of victory. As an ACU score increases by one
point, the margin decreases by only .06 of a percentage point. Ideology is
found to be a much stronger indicator than I had hypothesized.
According to the data, the number of years of service is also a significant
independent variable at the 0.1 level. Data indicates that for each year an
incumbent serves in the House, the margin of victory rises as well, but only
by a very small percentage (.01). Though the measure is a weak indicator
(.082889), these results are consistent with the stated hypothesis.
Political party, unlike other individual variables, is not statistically
significant and a weak indicator in detennining margin of victory. Because
Republican was coded as one, the party B value of 1.7144 indicates that
Republicans will be more likely to have a larger margin of victory. This
result is inconsistent with my hypothesis as well.
In summary, the findings indicate that, in general, demographic
characteristics, particularly income and education, have the most significant
impact on margin of victory. Additionally, political party measure and
education conflict with the original hypotheses. The expectation that political
party would be the most important determining factor of margin of victory is
not supported as the absolute strength only measured .082889.
Next, by distinguishing incumbents by the two main political parties,
Republican and Democrat, political party was expected to produce different
results when controlling for the independent variables. Therefore, I ran a
multiple regression model for each party to detennine which independent
variables had the greatest influence on margin of victory for Republicans
and Democrats. Table 2 indicates the results for Democratic incumbents while
Table 3 displays the Republican results.
According to the significant F values, the multiple regression model for
Democrats is collectively statistically significant at the .ססoo1 level, and the
Republicans' regression model is significant at .001. The multiple R square
in Table 2 indicates that 48% of the variance can be explained knowing the
measured independent variables. This is a much higher percentage of known
variance than was indicated in the frrst regression model. On the other hand,
Table 3's multiple R square of approximately 0.11 is extremely low, even
lower than the regression model in Thble 1, meaning only 11 % of the variance
can be explained. According to these results, other independent variables
may have more of an impact on Republicans' margin of victory than those
measured in this study.
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Table 2
Democratic Incumbents
B

Education
Ideology
Income
,88 Pres Vote
Service
(Constant)
R Square
Significant F

-.260927
.117506
.187256
-.834926
.002736
102.437157
.47939
.0000

Beta
-.183963
.185487
.136256
-.802000
.028085

Significant T
.0694
.0120
.2028
.0000
.6298

Table 3
Republican Incumbents
B

Education
Ideology
Income
,88 Pres Vote
Service
(Constant)
R Square
Significant F

.437441
.033978
-.394030
.021424
.339141
62.426568
.10872
.0009

Beta
.340009
.057054
-.366210
.078352
.247078

Significant T
.0076
.4361
.0044
.2709
.0009

When examining Table 2, the findings indicated that the Democratic
margin of victory supported four of five hypotheses. First, the strongest
absolute indicator and most statistically significant independent variable
affecting Democratic margin of victory is presidential vote reflecting political
culture. This is an opposite result of presidential vote impact in the frrst
regression model. For each percentage point George Bush gained, Democrats'
margin of victory decreases by eight tenths of a percentage. Therefore, it
could be assumed that Democrats are representative of their constituencies.
Next, the second most significant variable in determining margin of
victory for Democrats is ideology, a relatively strong indicator with a beta
weight of .185487. The higher the ACU score, the greater the margin of
victory for Democrats. This indicates that the more moderate a Democratic
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incumbent, the larger his margin of victory over a challenger, supporting the
original hypothesis.
Constituency income is not significant for Democrats. As income
increases, margin of victory for Democrats increases, unlike the other ftrst
regression model. This disproves the hypothesis that lower income constituents
tend to support Democratic candidates; however, this is not a statistically
signillcant result.
For Democrats, education is also statistically signillcant The education
beta weight for Democrats is .183963 and when controlling for all other
independent variables, the hypothesis is supported. As more people gain higher
levels of education (as the education variable increases by 1%), the margin
of victory for a Democrat decreases by approximately three tenths ofa percent.
Finally, the last variable analyzed is the most insignillcant for Democrats.
Service is statistically insignificant with a T score of .6298. Though
insignificant, service has a positive impact on margin of victory as
hypothesized. With each year of service in the House, the margin of victory
increases by .002 percent for Democrats.
When compared to the ftrst and second regression model ftndings,
Republican results, as shown in Table 3, indicate some similarities to the
previous models. The Republican margin of victory seems to support the
expected results in all cases except two. However, like the Democrats, several
of these results were found not to be statistically signiftcant.
The strongest indicator of Republican margin of victory, in contrast to
the Democratic results, is service. Service is signillcant at the .001 level for
Republicans with a beta weight of .247078. Like the Democrats, service has
a positive impact on margin of victory. With each year of service in the
House, the margin of victory increases by .34 percent, supporting the
hypothesis.
A demographic independent variable, constituency income, follows a
similar trend, statistically signillcant for the Republican margin of victory
and insigniftcant for Democratic margin of victory. The influence of income
on Republican margin of victory supports the hypothesis because margin
decreases by approximately four tenths of a percentage pointfor each $1,000
increase in income.
Along with income, another constituency variable, education, is
statistically signiftcant for Republican margin of victory, but it does not
support the hypotheses. The beta weight for Republicans is a strong coefficient
of .340009. As education increases by one percentage point, the margin of
victory also increases by 4 tenths of a percent. Perhaps because persons with
higher educations generally support Republicans, the margin of victory for
Republicans rises as constituents become more educated.
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The last two independent variables, presidential vote and ideology, are
not statistically significant indicators of Republican margin of victory. Though
insignificant, for each percentage point George Bush gained in the 1988
election, Republicans increase their margin by two hundredths of a percentage.
For ideology, the research indicated that as a Republican had a higher ACU
rating or the more conservative a Republican, the greater the margin of victory.
These findings discount the hypothesis.
When using party as an interactive control rather than additive variable,
demographic characteristics once again tend to be the most significant
variables. For Republicans, income and education are statistically significant
while presidential vote and education are significant for Democrats.
Democratic margin of victory appears to be greatly influenced by political
culture, measured by presidential vote. However, income tends to be the
strongest indicator for Republicans.

Conclusion
As demonstrated by these results, the four main reasons for incumbency
set forth by Alford and Brady are not the only factors influencing margin of
victory and incumbency. Rather, margin of victory is a culmination of many
factors ranging from constituency income and education to a representative's
years of service. In the first regression model, the independent variables are
collectively statistically significant, with income as the most significant factor
and strongest indicator ofmargin of victory. When using party as an interactive
variable in the second model, income is also the strongest indicator of margin
of victory for Republicans, and in the third model, presidential vote is a very
strong indicator for Democrats.
In conclusion, this study demonstrates that there are a number of factors
which influence an incumbent's margin of victory. This study may be
continued by examining other independent variables such as region, PAC
money, campaign expenditures, and gender, and also by comparing the 1996
election results with 1994 election resultsto see the change over time. These
independent variables may help to explain more of the variance of the
dependent variable, margin of victory.
Appendix
Data for this research were obtained from several sources, including
newspaper reports and almanacs. Roll Call, a Washington D.C. based
newspaper, provided the election results. Two demographic factors, education
and income, were obtained from Congressional Districts in the 1990s
published by Congressional Quarterly. The presidential voting measure was
found in Congressional Quarterly's Politics in America 1996, and the ACU
scores were taken from American Conservative Union rating scorecard.
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